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The Malacca Strait is a narrow waterway that extends nearly six hundred nau-tical miles from the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea, between Malaysia
and Indonesia. The strait provides a vital shipping lane for vessels sailing from
Europe and the Middle East to East Asia, as well as smaller vessels on local voy-
ages. Unfortunately, when we think of the Malacca Strait, images of a waterway
infested with pirates often spring to mind.
While this image could arguably have been justified in the past, it is now rather
outdated. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which pro-
duces quarterly and annual reports on piracy and
armed robbery against ships, there were only three suc-
cessful and four attempted attacks by pirates on ship-
ping in the Malacca Strait in 2007.1 This low level of
piracy has continued into 2008, with the Half Yearly
Report issued by the Regional Cooperation Agreement
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Center in
Singapore listing only one successful attack on a vessel
in the Malacca Strait and three attempted ones.2 Con-
sidering that around ninety thousand vessels transit the
strait on an annual basis, the proportion of ships being
attacked in the waterway is extremely small.
With statistics such as these, one might wonder
why we are still seeing the publication of articles such
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as one appearing in a recent issue of National Geographic Magazine, whose cover
delares, “The Strait of Malacca, Dark Passage: Pirates Haunt It. Sailors Fear It.
Global Trade Depends on It.”3 There seems to be a failure, particularly outside
the region, to keep pace with the change in the frequency of pirate attacks and
the scale of the problem. While piracy has certainly been a concern in the water-
way in the past, with reported attacks reaching seventy-five in 2000, the number
of cases has been falling since 2005, largely as a result of a number of counter-
measures introduced by the three littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore, and In-
donesia. This decrease in attacks was achieved despite a 10 percent increase in
cases worldwide.
This article will discuss the reduction in pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait
and how the attacks themselves have changed over the last decade. The measures
attributed to the reduction will then be discussed, as well as the underlying prin-
ciples and attitudes that have shaped these initiatives. Particular attention will
be given as to how the issue of sovereignty, a principle of utmost importance in
Southeast Asia, has impacted multilateral and bilateral cooperative efforts to ad-
dress the transnational problem of piracy, including a series of International
Maritime Organization (IMO) meetings convened to tackle pressing issues af-
fecting the safety and security of shipping in the Malacca Strait. The conclusions
will make recommendations regarding issues that require further action.
THE CHANGING NATURE OF PIRACY IN THE MALACCA STRAIT
Piracy has occurred in the Malacca Strait for hundreds of years. The October
1992 creation in Kuala Lumpur of the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center (PRC),
which was tasked with, among other things, collecting data on pirate attacks
around the world, started to highlight the scale of the problem in Southeast Asia.
However, it was not until the late 1990s that the issue came to the attention of the
international community.
This occurred primarily for two reasons. First, in 1997 the Asian financial cri-
sis had a harsh impact on the region. It is believed that the deteriorating eco-
nomic situation forced many people living in coastal areas in Indonesia and
Malaysia to turn to piracy to supplement their incomes. The economic collapse
also caused widespread political instability, in particular in Indonesia, making it
easier for people to pursue illegal methods of income generation. Second, in the
late 1990s several high-profile pirate attacks took place in the region, among
them the attack on the Petro Ranger in 1998. This may have led to an increased
tendency among shippers to report attacks, particularly attempted attacks or
more minor cases.
As a result of these factors, by the late 1990s the annual number of reported
pirate attacks in the strait had gone from virtually zero to seventy-five.4 Piracy
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was now seen as a significant problem that required urgent attention. One year
after piracy incidents peaked in the Malacca Strait, al-Qa‘ida launched its attack
on the Twin Towers in New York, demonstrating that ordinary means of trans-
portation can be utilized to carry out large-scale attacks on economically impor-
tant targets.
This incident prompted a reassessment of the vulnerability of the maritime
sector to attack by terrorists; in Southeast Asia, the presence of pirates operating
seemingly unchecked highlighted how insecure the maritime domain was. Spec-
ulation soon began as to the likelihood that the region’s pirates would cooperate
with regional or international terrorist groups to carry out a devastating attack
on shipping.
During this period there were several different types of piracy taking place in
the Malacca Strait.5 These included robbery of vessels at sea, the hijacking of ves-
sels, and kidnap-for-ransom attacks. Another common type of piracy takes
place against vessels berthed in harbors or at anchor. However, this type of attack
is unlikely to affect vessels on international voyages through the strait. The most
common targets in this case would be smaller vessels that transit the coast of In-
donesia or those on local voyages from, for example, Malaysia’s Port Klang to the
port of Belawan in Indonesia.
The robbery of a vessel by pirates usually takes place while the ship is under
way, often at night, and most often between one and six o’clock in the morning.
The pirates board the vessel using grappling hooks and then take any cash and
valuables from the ship’s safe and crew, including high-tech navigation equip-
ment or whatever else they can seize quickly. In this type of attack the value of
the stolen goods can be between ten and twenty thousand U.S. dollars.6 The ship
can be taken over for up to a few hours by from five to ten pirates, although many
incidents are over within half an hour.7 It is in this type of piracy that the most
significant reduction has taken place since 2000. This may be partially due to an
increased awareness on the part of crew members following the introduction of
new maritime security requirements for vessels.8
If a vessel is hijacked, it is usually seized for a significant length of time, per-
haps for several days, while the cargo is unloaded at a port selected by the pirates
or transferred to another vessel. Hijacking has been less common than the for-
mer type, simple robbery, because good intelligence gathering and careful plan-
ning prior to the attack are required to ascertain the cargo and route of the
vessel. A secure port to unload the stolen cargo is also needed, not to mention a
willing buyer.
A variation of this latter kind of piracy is the permanent seizure of a vessel by
pirates, who turn the vessel into a “phantom ship”; the key difference is that once
the pirates have disposed of the vessel’s cargo, they do not abandon the vessel
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itself. The ship is repainted and the crew dumped or killed. The ship then sails to
a new port with a false name and forged documentation.9 In recent years tugs
have been favorite targets of pirates, perhaps because they do not usually have
Automatic Identification System (AIS) equipment installed and yet are very
valuable ships. Also, they are easier to attack, given their low freeboards. Once
taken, they may be used in various maritime criminal activities, which would fa-
vor a small vessel of kinds commonly seen in ports and international waterways.
Kidnapping is the most serious form of piracy taking place in the Malacca
Strait since 2001. During a kidnap, armed attackers take over the vessel and ab-
duct two or three senior crew members, who are then held ashore pending ran-
som negotiations. The kidnapped crew members are usually released unharmed
following payment by their employers. Ransoms demanded can range from
US$100,000 to US$200,000. However, the sum of money eventually paid to the
attackers following negotiations is usually substantially lower, somewhere be-
tween ten and twenty thousand U.S. dollars.10
Of the three 2007 attacks deemed successful by the IMB in the Malacca Strait,
one was a boarding of a containership under way northwest of Pulau Perak: crew
members spotted flashlights on the deck of their vessel, and when they raised an
alarm a small boat was seen moving away from the ship. Another incident took
place when several unlit fishing boats approached a containership while it was
under way. The ship’s master took evasive action to deter the suspected pirates;
two were still able to board. However, the pirates were unarmed; they were de-
tained by the ship’s crew and handed over to the authorities in Singapore. The
third incident was a kidnapping; according to the IMB report documenting the
attack, “ten pirates armed with firearms boarded the tug towing the barge laden
with steel billets. The pirates damaged all communications equipments and
stole crew personal belongings and ship’s documents.” The pirates kidnapped
the master and the chief engineer, whom they took ashore. A ransom was de-
manded, and eleven days after they were kidnapped, following payment of the
ransom, the two were released.11
The details of the three incidents from 2007 reveal that two were essentially
unsuccessful. Although they were classified by the IMB as “actual attacks” rather
than “attempted attacks,” the pirates were able neither to steal anything nor at-
tack anyone during the incidents. Meanwhile, in the only successful case of pi-
racy documented in the first half of 2008 in ReCAAP’s Half Yearly Report,
pirates reportedly attacked two fishing trawlers in the early hours of the morn-
ing while the vessels were under way. All the crew members were thrown over-
board off a nearby island in Indonesia. The crews were rescued, but the trawlers
have yet to be located.12 It is likely that the vessels and their cargoes were sold on
the black market.
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If the overall frequency of pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait has been signifi-
cantly reduced in recent years, however, kidnapping remains a worrisome threat,
especially given the great danger it poses to crew members. The continued oc-
currence of this form of piracy, even at low levels, necessitates a reexamination
of the various countermeasures that have been implemented to improve secu-
rity in the Malacca Strait. The current practice is for the employers of kidnapped
crews to pay ransoms for their release. It is widely acknowledged by experts in
this field that not only does paying ransom encourage further kidnappings, but
the ransom money often goes to finance weaponry to be used in future attacks. A
policy of no negotiation with kidnappers must be adopted to make kidnapping a
nonprofitable industry.
HOW PIRACY WAS REDUCED
International pressure has been exerted on the littoral states, in particular on In-
donesia and Malaysia, to address the problem of piracy.13 This effort began in
2000, when piracy attacks peaked in the Malacca Strait, and increased even more
following the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent conclusions
drawn about the possible insecurity of the maritime domain. At this time, both
Japan and the United States indicated a desire to participate in enhancing secu-
rity in the waterway. However, it was not until 2004 that real steps toward secur-
ing the strait were made.
There were several stumbling blocks. Malaysia and Indonesia saw the issue of
piracy purely as a domestic concern to be addressed internally by each state as it
saw fit. They repeatedly emphasized their desire to uphold the sovereignty of
their territorial waters, which make up most of the waterway. Singapore was
more willing to cooperate, on both the regional and extraregional levels. Its
stand on the issue was voiced by the then deputy prime minister Tony Tan at a
2004 conference on maritime security in Singapore, during a discussion on the
issue of patrolling the strait: “It is not realistic to unilaterally confine such pa-
trols only to countries in this part of the world. . . . [W]e can do more if we galva-
nize the resources of extra-regional players.”14
The concerns of Malaysia and Indonesia were heightened when Admiral
Thomas B. Fargo, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, outlined a
proposal by the United States called the Regional Maritime Security Initiative in
a speech to the U.S. Congress on 31 March 2004. In his statement he remarked
that “we’re looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting Special Operations
Forces on high-speed vessels to conduct effective interdiction in, once again,
these sea lines of communication where terrorists are known to move about.”15
In response to the suggestion by Fargo, the Malaysian prime minister, Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi, remarked, “I think we can look after our own area.”16
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Another disagreement that stalled cooperation was in the level of priority
that should be given to addressing the problem of piracy over other, more press-
ing domestic issues. This applied particularly to Indonesia, which was still re-
covering from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and it manifested itself in a
public denial of the reported scale of the piracy problem in Indonesian waters.
Another reason why Indonesia was reluctant to address the problem of piracy
may have been that only 25–30 percent of the military’s expenditure was covered
by the military budget following the financial crisis, with the remaining funds
believed to be coming from illegal activities, such as piracy.17
Even today, inadequate resources and a lack of funding prevent Indonesia
from fully addressing the problem; according to the navy chief of staff, Admiral
Slamet Soebijanto, the country is still in need of another 262 patrol ships to
make up a total of 376, the amount deemed necessary to safeguard Indonesia’s
seventeen thousand islands.18 In addition, of the 114 vessels that the Indonesian
navy currently has, only 25 percent are believed to be serviceable at any given
time.19
Even in its ports, Indonesia is struggling to enforce regulations that have now
become an international norm: in September 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard issued
a warning to the Indonesian transport ministry stating that it had found seven
port terminals that did not fully comply with the ISPS Code (a set of measures
designed to enhance the security of ships and port facilities that were made
mandatory under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, of
which Indonesia is a signatory).
NEW MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES
Despite these problems, several maritime security initiatives were introduced in
the Malacca Strait between 2004 and 2007. Although significant, they have argu-
ably been constrained in their scope and capability by both the unwillingness of
some of the littoral states to cooperate fully and a lack of resources. The first
multilateral measure to be introduced by the three littoral states was the Trilat-
eral Coordinated Patrol, or MALSINDO.
MALSINDO was launched in July 2004 and involved the navies of Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Singapore patrolling in a coordinated fashion in their respec-
tive territorial waters. Following the introduction of this new measure, how-
ever, there was no immediate reduction in the number of pirate attacks taking
place in the strait. The lack of a provision for cross-border pursuit into each of
the participating states’ territorial waters has been cited as the main flaw in this
measure. However, cross-border pursuit would have been viewed by the par-
ticipating states as an infringement of their sovereignty.20
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Five months after the introduction of MALSINDO, an earthquake occurred
off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The earthquake triggered a series of
devastating tsunamis that affected most coastlines bordering the Indian Ocean.
However, the areas worst hit were in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh, on the
northern tip of Sumatra, an area in which many pirates were believed to be
based. Some coastal villages in Aceh are thought to have lost more than 70 per-
cent of their inhabitants, while 44 percent of the people lost their livelihoods.21
Reports received by the IMB in the weeks after the tsunami indicated that pi-
racy attacks in the Malacca Strait had ceased. Even unaffected areas recorded
zero attacks immediately following the disaster.22 The significance of the impact
that the tsunami seems to have had on pirate incidents in the waterway is evident
in a comparison of the total attacks in 2004 with those in 2005, which show a
more than 60 percent reduction, from thirty-eight to twelve.23 However, this ex-
planation cannot account for the continued decline in piracy from 2005 to 2007.
It was predicted that “once life resumes normally in North Sumatra crime will
return and with it attacks against ships.”24 Yet four years on from the disaster,
when life has certainly returned to some measure of normality in the affected ar-
eas, the frequency of pirate attacks has not returned to its 2004 levels.
One explanation could be the changing political situation in Aceh. Before the
tsunami, the province had been the site of a bitter twenty-six-year conflict be-
tween the Free Aceh Movement (known by its Indonesian abbreviation, GAM)
and the Indonesian authorities. Around thirty-five thousand Indonesian troops
and 14,700 police had been stationed in the area in an effort to suppress the
GAM independence movement. However, following the tsunami both parties
were brought to the negotiating table in order to discuss the disaster relief opera-
tion. This paved the way for a peace deal that was signed in August 2005.
Under the terms of the settlement, the GAM agreed to decommission its
weapons and dissolve its armed wing, while the Indonesian authorities agreed to
withdraw more than half of their forces from the area. As a result, around eight
hundred weapons were handed in by the rebels and more than twenty-five thou-
sand Indonesian troops left. Given that both GAM rebels and Indonesian troops
had been accused of carrying out piracy, this development may well have played
a part in the reduction in the number of attacks in the Malacca Strait.
The introduction in September 2005 of joint air patrols over the strait by the
littoral states may have been another factor contributing to the decline in the
number of incidents. The three states each donate two planes for the patrols,
known as the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) plan. The plan permits aircraft to fly for up
to three nautical miles into the twelve-nautical-mile territorial waters of the par-
ticipating states; it was hoped that this measure would provide a valuable
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supplement to the trilateral coordinated sea patrols, which were limited to their
own territorial waters.
Politically, EiS was significant because it was the first time the littoral states
had been willing to put aside concerns over the sovereignty of their territorial
waters and allow foreign forces across the border. This compromise included the
agreement that each patrolling aircraft would have on board a representative
from each of the three littoral states. Later, in April 2006 both MALSINDO and
EiS were brought together under the umbrella of the Malacca Strait Patrols.
Despite its political success, EiS has been criticized as superficial and a mere
reflection of the desire of the littoral states to be seen to be doing something in
the face of international pressure. It is estimated that seventy sorties per week
need to be carried out by the aerial patrols in order to monitor the strait effec-
tively, 24/7. However, currently only eight are flown. There is also a lack of patrol
vessels to carry out investigation and interdiction, if necessary, following the
sighting of a suspect vessel by the aerial patrols.25 It would seem that EiS’s appar-
ent success in helping to prevent any resurgence in attacks may be a function
more of its deterrent effect than of its actual, practical application.
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy
The most recent antipiracy initiative to be implemented is ReCAAP, which came
into force in 2006. The agreement, which encompasses the whole region, was
drafted in 2004 and required the signature and ratification of ten of the partici-
pating countries—all the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, plus Japan, China, Korea, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—in order to
enter into force. The aim of the initiative, which is the first antipiracy measure to
be implemented on a government-to-government level, is to foster multilateral
cooperation to combat the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Its
activity takes the forms of information sharing, capacity building, and coopera-
tive arrangements.
A total of fourteen countries have now signed and ratified the agreement, and
an Information Sharing Center, or ISC, has been set up in Singapore to facilitate
communication and information exchange between member countries and to
produce regular reports on pirate attacks in the region.26 Information is ex-
changed between designated points of contact, or “focal points,” in the member
countries via a secure Web-based information-network system, on a 24/7 basis.
In addition to acting as a point of information exchange, these focal points man-
age piracy incidents within their territorial waters, facilitate their respective
countries’ law enforcement investigations, and coordinate surveillance and en-
forcement with neighboring focal points.27
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Nonetheless, the agreement has not yet been signed or ratified by Malaysia or
Indonesia; the two countries have signaled a willingness to cooperate with the
ISC, but to date no progress has been made toward securing their formal accep-
tances of the agreement. The lack of participation by Malaysia and Indonesia
cannot help but cast doubt on its effectiveness, particularly given Indonesia’s
status as the most pirate-prone country in the world and both countries’ strate-
gic positions along the Malacca Strait.28
Although these antipiracy measures suffer from obvious and sometimes seri-
ous flaws, the continued decline in the number of pirate attacks in the waterway
is testimony to their collective success, even if that success has been more in
terms of improving security awareness on the part of the shippers and in deter-
ring perpetrators. However, if piracy is to be completely eradicated in the
strait—an important task, given that organized criminals are still able to carry
out successful kidnappings in the waterway—countermeasures need to become
more targeted. In particular, the land bases and networks of pirates need to be
disrupted; without these, the pirates cannot launch effective attacks on the
water.
The International Maritime Organization Meetings
During this period of increased multilateral activity among the littoral states,
another process has been under way at the international level, in cooperation
with the IMO. The initiative was conceived by the IMO in 2004 with the aim of
promoting a comprehensive approach to security, safety, and pollution control
in critical sea-lanes around the world. Known as the “Protection of Vital
Sealanes” initiative, it takes as its current focus the straits of Malacca and Singa-
pore. A series of meetings was convened under the title “Straits of Malacca and
Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection,” the first
of them in Jakarta in 2005. This was followed by another meeting in Kuala
Lumpur in 2006 and then one a year later in Singapore.
These meetings are significant with regard to piracy in the Malacca Strait less
for what they produced than for what they did not produce. At the start of this
process there was speculation that these meetings would result in some sort of
organized burden sharing of the maintenance of security in the waterway, with
at least some involvement of the user states, in the form of financial or resource
donation. This assumption seemed to be borne out when during the Jakarta
meeting it was agreed that “a mechanism be established by the three littoral
States to meet on a regular basis with user States, the shipping industry and
other stakeholders with an interest in the safe navigation through the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore (the Straits) . . . to discuss issues relating to the safety, se-
curity and environmental protection of the Straits.”29
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However, it was later stated, at the Singapore meeting, that “the scope of the
Co-operative Mechanism focuses on safety of navigation and environmental
protection in the Straits.”30 That is, the word “security” had been dropped from
the discussions. Indeed, this more narrow focus on safety of navigation and en-
vironmental protection was reflected in the list of six projects, outlined by the
littoral states during the Kuala Lumpur meeting, that are to be addressed under
the framework of the Co-operative Mechanism:
(i) Removal of wrecks in the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Straits;
(ii) Cooperation and capacity building on Hazardous and Noxious Substance
(HNS) preparedness and response in the Straits;
(iii) Demonstration project of class B automatic identification system (AIS)
transponder on small ships;
(iv) Setting up a tide, current and wind measurement system for the Straits to
enhance navigation safety and marine environment protection;
(v) Replacement and maintenance of aids to navigation in the Straits;
(vi) Replacement of aids to navigation damaged by the tsunami incident.31
The outcome of this process shows once again that the littoral states, in par-
ticular Indonesia and Malaysia, are unwilling to share the responsibility of
maintaining security in the straits with the user states. While ad hoc contribu-
tions from user states on a bilateral basis have been accepted in the past for im-
proving security in the waterway, there seems to be a desire at present to avoid
any long-term institutionalization of the process—which, according to the In-
donesian state secretary, Hatta Radjasa, would provide an opportunity for the
involvement of foreign forces in securing the waterway.32
The outcome of the meetings also reflects the view that improving naviga-
tional safety in the straits and the protection of their marine resources is of the
greatest regional concern. Although completely eradicating the piracy threat is
considered a laudable goal, piracy still poses very little risk to the majority of ves-
sels passing through the straits, while navigational safety and environmental
concerns affect them all equally.
In the short term, it would seem that low levels of piracy will continue to occur
in the Malacca Strait until countermeasures are developed that address the root
causes of the problem and not just the symptoms. Economic development must
be encouraged among the coastal areas of Indonesia and Malaysia in order to re-
duce unemployment, and corruption of local officials also needs to be ad-
dressed. However, antipiracy measures already in place should not be neglected;
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they need to be continuously developed to keep pace with the changing nature
of piracy in the waterway.
It is clear from events over the past few years that maintaining the security of
the straits and dealing with the problem of piracy will remain the responsibility
of the three littoral states. The role of the user states will continue to be limited to
ad hoc financial or resource contributions, supplemented by diplomatic pres-
sure. Whether or not this is to the detriment of the fight against piracy in the
Malacca Strait, it is most likely to remain the status quo for many years to come.
What is needed now is greater attention to regions that are considerably more
insecure than the Malacca Strait. According to one maritime security expert,
“while international attention was focused on the Strait of Malacca . . . the secu-
rity situation in the sea lanes linking the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia
[was] allowed to deteriorate.”33 The areas referred to are the Sulu and Celebes
seas—the first of which is located in southwest Philippines, while the Celebes
Sea is bordered by the Phillipine island of Mindanao to the north, Sabah and
Kalimantan to the west, and Indonesia’s Sulawesi Island to the south. Largely as a
result of the separatist conflict taking place in Mindanao, the areas have become
“notorious for illegal maritime activities such as smuggling, piracy, and traffick-
ing in illegal narcotics, guns and people.”34
While the claim that the situation in these areas has been allowed to deterio-
rate further due to the current focus on the Malacca Strait may be to some extent
unwarranted, clearly these areas have been insecure for some time and this
should be addressed. Meanwhile, other parts of the world, including Bangla-
desh, are experiencing sharp increases in piracy. Lessons learned in the fight
against piracy in the Malacca Strait should be applied to other regions to make
these waters more secure. No longer should there be a false perception that the
Malacca Strait is a “Dark Passage.” Rather, it is time for it to be held up as an ex-
ample to the rest of the world of how piracy can successfully be reduced.
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